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G E N E PA R K

The Politics of Budgeting in Japan
How Much Do Institutions Matter?
A B S T R AC T

In the past decade, the Japanese government has revamped its budget institutions
twice. This paper examines how these changes have changed the configuration of
power among the actors in the budget process. It also explores the implications of
these changes for the management of the nation’s finances.
K E Y W O R D S : Japanese politics, budget politics, fiscal policy, budget institutions,
public spending

INTRODUCTION

In the past decade, the Japanese government has undertaken two systematic
efforts to reform its budget institutions and budget process. First, in 2001,
the government established a new body, the Council on Economic and Fiscal Policy (CEFP), charged with overseeing budget and economic policy.
With the historic victory by the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) in 2009,
the new government immediately set to work overhauling the budget process
for the coming fiscal year (FY), creating two new budget institutions. These
efforts to reform Japan’s budget process have implications both for how the
government manages its finances and the nature of political control over
budget making. This paper asks: What impact has Japan’s budget reform
had, if any, and what impact is it likely to have in the future?
W H Y B U D G E T I N S T I T U T I O N S M AT T E R

The issue of Japan’s budget institutions is one of both real-world and theoretical significance. Since 1991, the budget has been in deficit every FY, and
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the nation now faces net public debt of over 100% of gross domestic product
(GDP). This figure will rise considerably as a consequence of the global financial crisis that began in 2008. These deficits and high public debt are
daunting national political challenges that threaten Japan’s future economic
prosperity. Servicing its public debt consumes a growing share of its limited
budgetary resources and will leave a large fiscal burden for future generations
to bear. For 2010 (FY), bond issuances will total a staggering 48% of the
budget, exceeding tax revenues for the first time in Japan’s postwar history.
As the country’s population ages, social security expenditures continue to rise
while the base of workers paying taxes and social insurance declines. The
government has been helped by low interest rates, but this is unlikely to
continue indefinitely.
As research has shown, budget deficits are a problem rooted in the nature
of the costs and benefits of public spending. Budget deficits can arise as a
result of the rational calculations of political actors.1 Because tax revenues are
a common resource, the problem of a “common pool” arises. The benefits
accruing from the use of tax revenue are typically highly concentrated, e.g.,
targeted toward a specific region or group, while the costs of higher budget
deficits are widely dispersed, i.e., paid for by a common pool tax base. This
produces a systematic bias toward budget deficits because there is an asymmetry between the benefits and costs, with some groups or regions capturing
benefits while bearing only a fraction of the cost. Research on this problem
has demonstrated, however, that a variety of factors, such as strong budget
institutions that force actors to internalize the costs of budget deficits, can
alleviate the common pool problem.2 As von Hagen and Hallerberg argue,
when a government delegates authority to a centralized budget apparatus, it
will have an incentive to mitigate budget deficits, as this will be one of the
criteria by which its success will be measured.3 Hahm, Kamlet, and Mowery
have reached a similar conclusion based on their empirical analysis showing
that stronger fiscal bureaucracies produce lower fiscal deficits.4 Budget institutions matter because they shape fiscal performance.
1. James M. Poterba and Jurgen von Hagen, “Introduction,” in Fiscal Institutions and Fiscal Performance, James M. Poterba and Jurgen von Hagen, eds. (Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press, 1999).
2. Ibid.
3. Jurgen von Hagen and Mark Hallerberg, “Electoral Institutions, Cabinet Negotiations, and
Budget Deficits within the European Union,” in ibid., Poterba and von Hagen, eds., pp. 214–15.
4. Sung Deuk Hahm, Mark S. Kamlet, and David Mowery, “The Political Economy of Deficit
Spending in Nine Industrialized Parliamentary Democracies,” Comparative Political Studies 29:1 (1996).
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Budget institutions also matter because they structure the relative influence of various actors over the budget process. This has been an issue of keen
interest in Japan, because the movement to reform the country’s budget institutions has been largely motivated by the goal of increasing the role of the
executive in the budget process. Strengthening budget institutions, along
with other administrative reforms, would remove the ills of disconnected,
bottom-up policy making (tatewari gyōsei), an overly powerful bureaucracy,
and political interference from party backbenchers. This was true of the Liberal Democratic Party’s (LDP) creation of the CEFP, and even more so for
the DPJ’s current reform. The extent to which the CEFP strengthened the
cabinet has been debated among Japan scholars. Some have found that the
CEFP has in fact tipped the balance of power from party backbenchers and
the bureaucracy in favor of the prime minister and cabinet.5 Mulgan, however, has argued that the CEFP has not fundamentally changed the balance
of power.6 This study will not definitively settle this debate, but the issue of
budgeting is particularly germane to the discussion because greater budget
control has been a central goal of reforms to enhance political leadership.
T H E B U D G E T P R O C E S S P R I O R TO 2 0 0 1

As in all countries, the budget process has several layers of budget decisions.
First, governments must determine the overall budget size, level of deficit
financing, and overall fiscal stance. Second, governments make decisions
regarding the allocation of funds to broad areas such as defense or social security. Finally, there are thousands of micro-level decisions regarding the
funding of specific policies and projects.7 In the Japanese context, prior to
2001 this process typically proceeded from June until March of the following
year (Japan’s FY runs from April 1 to the subsequent end of March). Figure 1
illustrates the key steps in the process. The old budget process began in June
with a determination of the overall size of the budget. After considering a
number of factors, such as the state of the economy, projected revenues, debt
5. Mitsuo Hosen, “Acceleration of Economic Reform in Japan and the Role of the Council on
Economic and Fiscal Policy,” in Microeconomic Foundations of Economic Performance in East Asia
(Manila: East Asian Bureau of Economic Research, 2006).
6. Aurelia George Mulgan, Japan’s Failed Revolution: Koizumi and the Politics of Economic Reform
(Canberra: Asia Pacific Press, 2002), pp. 213–31.
7. The author would like to thank an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this framework for
analyzing the budget process.
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figure 1. The Old Budget Process
Budget process starts

June

Budget request guideline

July

Spending ministry budget requests

August

Ministry of Finance (MOF) budget

December

Cabinet approval of budget

December

Submission to Diet
Diet approval

January
March

source: By author.

levels, and so forth, the government issued the budget request guideline,
sometimes referred to as the budget ceiling, which sets a numerical target for
the coming FY that was not to be exceeded. The purpose of the budget request guideline was to provide a baseline for ministries to use in compiling
their formal budget requests for the coming FY.
The setting of the budget guideline was one of the most important stages
in budget negotiations because it determined how large the pie would be.
During the 1990s, the budget guideline also indicated at least very roughly
the government’s priorities, specifying funding levels for certain sectors such
as social security and public works. Under normal circumstances, the government typically adhered to the budget guideline, although it was not binding. In later stages of budget negotiations, the government could revise target
budget totals depending on a variety of factors such as macroeconomic conditions or other pressing needs. If a severe economic downturn occurred, for
instance, the government might increase the budget total in order to stimulate the economy or, as happened during the first Gulf War, the government
increased spending to finance the war effort.
The MOF compiled the budget request guideline, but it was the product
of intense political negotiation. Typically, backbenchers from the longtime
ruling LDP and the spending ministries (i.e., all those other than the MOF)
attempted to increase their allocations. LDP politicians were particularly
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interested in increasing spending in areas that would help them channel support to their constituents (e.g., public works) or for other policies in which
they had a particular interest. The spending ministries maneuvered to raise
their totals or avoid cuts. Zoku (politicians with specific policy expertise)
Diet members and spending ministries often collaborated. Zoku interceded
on behalf of spending ministries, and the latter responded to requests from
zoku. During these negotiations, MOF, which consistently advocated fiscal
discipline, attempted to keep the budget request guideline as low as possible.
But the ministry was constrained by the need to secure the approval of the
LDP, the prime minister, and the cabinet. MOF was in constant communication with all of these groups throughout the entire budget process, attempting to gauge what was politically feasible. 8 The ruling party and
government signaled to MOF its priorities through these channels of communication, but these interactions also provided an opportunity for MOF
to convince the political leadership of the need to limit spending. The bulk
of the negotiations occurred through these informal, behind-the-scenes
channels, but in cases where there was persistent disagreement, the government and LDP leadership brokered settlements.
Both the government—the prime minister and cabinet—and the ruling
party played active roles in the budget process. Formally, the prime minister
and cabinet approved the budget request guidelines and submitted a budget
bill to the Diet, but behind the scenes, the LDP participated in the budget
process. Whether the ruling party or the government was the ultimate arbiter is difficult to determine. Mulgan argues that the LDP, not the government, called the shots, a situation that she dubs an “un-Westminster
system.”9 There is some degree of truth to this in the case of the budget process, but it is also true that some prime ministers were able to override internal party opposition, as in the 1980s, when Prime Minister Nakasone
Yasuhiro imposed zero-growth budget ceilings.
The budget request guideline served as the basis for formal budget requests made by spending ministries. At this point, budget negotiations were
largely over the distribution of the total amount of funds: it was understood
that the requests would not exceed the budget request guideline, barring
some kind of significant change in circumstances (e.g., onset of a recession).
8. Maurice Wright, Japan’s Fiscal Crisis: The Ministry of Finance and the Politics of Public Spending, 1975–2000 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 275–311.
9. Mulgan, Japan’s Failed Revolution.
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Spending ministry bureaucrats, zoku Diet members, and MOF were the key
actors that determined the composition of the spending within this guideline at the micro level. The process was largely bottom-up. Spending ministry bureaucrats took the lead role, and in some cases bureaucrats cooperated
with the zoku Diet members, who interceded to win funding for public
works projects or other policy areas they deemed important. MOF, specifically its budget examiners, reviewed specific spending requests, attempting
to cut unnecessary spending in order to keep requests as low as possible. The
allocation for public works and public investment was particularly contentious because both were important to LDP politicians who wanted to deliver
concrete goods to their constituents. In rare cases when disputes could not
be reconciled, the issue moved up the hierarchy, advancing to the deputy
director of the Budget Bureau. Only occasionally did an issue reach the administrative vice minister, the highest civil service position in MOF, and
even less frequently the minister of finance. The party leadership and government intervened to settle only the most intractable disputes.10
After the spending ministries and MOF agreed on their spending requests,
MOF compiled a draft, the so-called “MOF budget.” From this stage forward, most of the big political issues had already been settled through prior
negotiation (some exceptions are discussed below), although zoku Diet members and spending ministries did attempt to make minor changes such as restoring funding for specific projects. After completion of the MOF budget, a
final round, the “revival negotiations,” opened, allowing for minor changes.
This final stage was partly political theater, because the amount of funds set
aside by MOF for these negotiations was already determined and known by
all the key parties. During these negotiations, concessions were made in Japan’s so-called “second budget,” the Fiscal Investment Loan Program (FILP).11
The final changes were then incorporated into a cabinet budget plan. The
cabinet voted on the official budget plan, which at this point was largely a
formality. The budget bill was then submitted to the House of Representatives, the lower house, for deliberation and a vote. The House of Councilors,
the upper chamber of the Diet, also considers the budget, although its role
is inferior to that of the House of Representatives. In cases where there is
disagreement between the two houses that cannot be resolved, or if the
10. Author interview with MOF official, Tokyo, June 27, 2008.
11. Gene Park, Spending without Taxation: FILP and the Politics of Public Finance in Japan (Palo
Alto, Calif.: Stanford University Press, forthcoming 2011).
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upper house has not acted within 30 days after receipt of the budget passed
by the House of Representatives, the latter’s decision stands, as stipulated in
Article 60 of the Constitution. In practice, though, with a few exceptions the
passage through both houses was largely a formality because the political
negotiations within the ruling party or coalition had already occurred.
In addition to the initial government budget described above, there were
two other important sources of public spending: supplementary budgets and
the FILP Plan. The supplementary budget was a mid-year adjustment: the
government might have passed a supplementary budget because of changes
during the relevant FY. For instance, economic growth might have produced
more revenue than expected, pressures from the U.S. government to stimulate domestic demand might have increased, or a recession might have indicated the use of fiscal stimulus. In some cases, the supplementary budget also
became an extension of the political negotiations over the initial budget. If
funding could not be found for certain programs or policies during the initial budget negotiations, deals were sometimes cut with the understanding
that the government would pass a mid-year supplementary budget to provide
funds for them.12 Whatever the motivation, supplementary budgets became
very common and a significant source of budget indiscipline.
FILP was, and still is, a system for mobilizing savings for governmentdirected loans and investments that serve a public policy function. The government used FILP to pay for a significant portion of its public works and
also to provide subsidized loans for housing, small and medium enterprise,
and other users. Every year the government drew up a FILP Plan, which
specified the overall level of funding for the coming FY and the specific allocation levels to the public and quasi-public bodies that invest or lend the
funds. The process of drawing up the FILP Plan ran parallel to that of the
formal budget. During budget negotiations, the FILP Plan served as a tool
to broker compromises. Since FILP did not draw on limited tax revenues,
MOF often preferred that spending ministries use FILP funds.13
THE CEFP

In early 2001, with the establishment of the CEFP, a new player was added
to the budget process. The CEFP was housed within a new cabinet office
12. Author interview with MOF official, Tokyo, June 24, 2008.
13. Park, Spending without Taxation.

AS5005_07_Park.indd 971

10/19/10 10:29 AM

972 • asian sur v ey 5 0 : 5

intended to set and coordinate the direction of policy. The creation of the
CEFP and more specifically the attempt to give the cabinet a larger role in
fiscal policy were the culmination of a number of political currents. Proposals to transfer budget authority from MOF to the cabinet surfaced numerous
times throughout the postwar period. Specifically, some argued that the
Budget Bureau of MOF should be moved to the cabinet, giving the executive the capacity to draft the budget. MOF vigorously opposed such an idea.
Within MOF, the Budget Bureau has been the most powerful bureau, and
budgeting its most valued function. Given MOF’s perceived success in managing the economy and its extensive networks within the LDP,14 the ministry
was able to thwart such reform plans, at least until the 1990s.
In the 1990s, the political situation of MOF changed dramatically, as
Grimes, Amyx, and others have recounted.15 First, MOF’s reputation as an
effective steward of economic policy came into question. As Japan’s economic bubble collapsed and the economy entered a period of prolonged
stagnation and financial crisis, MOF bore much of the blame, in some cases
justifiably and in others not, for Japan’s weak economy. Second, a steady
stream of misdeeds and corruption by MOF officials provoked a public
backlash against the ministry. Third, LDP support for MOF decreased.
Bashing bureaucrats became an effective and popular electoral strategy, for
the opposition as well as the LDP. MOF’s easy cooperation with the first
coalition government that excluded the LDP, from 1993 to 1994, also produced a resentment of the ministry within the party.16
All of these factors made MOF an obvious political target as Hashimoto
Ryūtarō’s administration embarked upon an ambitious reform to reorganize
the bureaucracy and change the policymaking process. As the reform agenda
advanced, MOF faced the threat of a full dismemberment. Various proposals
suggested removing banking and securities regulation from MOF control—
as well as its budgeting function. In the end, MOF suffered a severe defeat.
The government transferred banking and securities regulation to two newly
created entities. A revision to the Bank of Japan Law, which gave the central
14. Jennifer A. Amyx, Japan’s Financial Crisis, Institutional Rigidity, and Reluctant Change (Prince
ton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 2004), pp. 49–55.
15. Ibid.; and William W. Grimes, Unmaking the Japanese Miracle: Macroeconomic Politics, 1985–
2000 (Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press, 2001).
16. Masaru Mabuchi, Ōkūrashō Wa Naze Oitsumerareta No Ka: Seikan Kankei No Henbō [Why is
the Ministry of Finance always under attack? The transformation of political-bureaucratic relations]
(Tokyo: Chūo Kōronsha, 1997).
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bank greater autonomy, also reduced MOF influence over monetary policy.
The only silver lining for MOF was that it managed to preserve its budgetary
function.17 As part of Hashimoto’s Central Ministries and Agencies Reform
Basic Law, the law that established the newly restructured MOF in fact reiterated the ministry’s responsibility for planning, drafting, and executing the
budget (Article 4).18
Although MOF kept the Budget Bureau intact, the political struggle over
the budget was not finished. In order to strengthen the executive with more
power and resources, the government created a new Cabinet Secretariat and
a new Cabinet Office. As part of this reform, the government passed the
Cabinet Office Establishment Law in 1999, which provided for creation of
the CEFP within the Cabinet Office. In the lead-up to passage, MOF attempted to weaken the new body’s role in the budget process, even seeking
to eliminate “fiscal” from its name.19
The CEFP and the Budget Process

The CEFP was charged with drafting the basic policy direction for management of the whole economy, including fiscal policy and budget formulation.20 The prime minister headed the CEFP, which indeed became part of
the Cabinet Office. Other members included the chief cabinet secretary,
minister of Finance, minister of Economic and Fiscal Policy, minister of
Internal Affairs and Communications, and minister of Economic Trade and
Industry. Also on the council were four private-sector members appointed
by the prime minister. The staff of the CEFP was a combination of civil
servants in the Cabinet Office (the largest number), civil servants seconded
from other ministries, and private staff who accompanied the private sector
members of the CEFP. MOF seconded only a few staff and reportedly had
limited influence via this channel.21
17. Grimes, Unmaking the Japanese Miracle, p. 208.
18. Akira Okada, “Keizai Zaisei Shimon Kaigi, Tokumei Tantō Daijin” [Minister in charge of
special assignments, Council on Economic and Fiscal Policy], in Chūō Shōchō Kaikaku, Hashimoto
Kaikakuga Mezashita ‘Kono Kuni No Katachi’ [Central government reform, the kind of government
Hashimoto wanted to create], Akira Okada and Kazuaki Tanaka, eds. (Tokyo: Nihon hyōron sha,
2000), p. 126.
19. Ibid., pp. 125–26.
20. Prime Minister’s Office of Japan, August 20, 2009, <http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/policy/
keizai/index_e.html>.
21. MOF official, June 24, 2008, interview.
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figure 2. The CEFP and the Budget Process
Budget process starts

April

CEFP’s Basic Policies

June

Budget request guideline

July

Spending ministry budget requests

August

MOF budget

December

Cabinet approval of budget

December

Submission to Diet
Diet approval

January
March

source: By author.

The CEFP was not only a new player in the budget process, it was also the
starting point (see Figure 2). Under the pre-reform process, the first major
step was drafting the budget request guideline outlined above. After the establishment of the CEFP, it kicked off the budget process by deliberating its
basic approach to the budget for the coming FY, starting with a review of the
key numbers such as GDP growth forecast and expected tax revenues. The
process began as early as April. On the basis of its discussions, the CEFP
drafted a document called the “Basic Policies for Economic and Fiscal Policy
Management and Structural Reform” (hereafter, Basic Policies), setting out
the basic principles for the coming budget; it was then submitted to the
cabinet for approval. The cabinet-approved Basic Policies stated the broad
policy direction of the government and how this should be reflected in the
upcoming budget. Thus, the CEFP was intended to give the government
greater control in setting overall fiscal policy—how it would relate to overarching macroeconomic policies—and influence over how the budget would
reflect government priorities. These would be articulated publicly and more
specifically than in the past.
Although the Basic Policies typically did not include any specific numbers, they were a critical, highly contested part of the budget process because
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they served as the basis for subsequent budget request guidelines and could
constrain or enable requests for spending.
After the Basic Policies were drafted, the remainder of the budget process
followed a path very similar to the previous one. One exception was the
items that the CEFP decided to continue deliberating. Such items typically
included large spending areas such as social security or public works. CEFP
deliberations could last through the fall; once outstanding issues were settled, these would be reflected in the budget. Finally, it is important to note
that the CEFP did not deliberate tax issues.
T H E C E F P : Q U E S T I O N S O F E F F I CAC Y

The creation of the new Cabinet Office and the CEFP within it was intended to strengthen the executive, centralize policymaking, and enhance
control over the bureaucracy. This section considers whether the CEFP and
its new role in the budget process in fact produced these changes.
Did the CEFP strengthen the executive’s role in the budget process and
alter the balance of power between the key actors? Who called the shots?
And in cases where there were disagreements, who prevailed? According to
those touting the reforms, the strengthening of the cabinet and creation of the
CEFP would prevent fragmented, bottom-up policymaking. Such policies resulted from initiatives making their way up vertically separated bureaus and
ministries (tatewari gyōsei), and from efforts to shift the policymaking initiative from the bureaucracy to the cabinet. The reform was intended to
enhance the power of the executive at the expense of the ruling party, which
often prevented effective government leadership. This meant the executive
would use the CEFP to take charge of the budget process while diminishing
the influence of bureaucrats and ruling party backbenchers. As one LDP
member involved in the reform, Ishihara Nobuteru, commented, “We need
a system that allows the prime minister to direct and supervise the most
important parts of the budget, its basic features, mechanisms, scale and so
forth.”22
A review of how the new budget process functioned, in particular how it
shaped the interactions among key actors, is presented below. The discussion
is organized into sections on individual prime ministers because each had
different priorities and leadership styles. The following focuses primarily on
22. Okada, “Keizai Zaisei Shimon Kaigi,” p. 122.
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the early stages of the budget negotiations because this is the part of the
budget process that changed. The analysis pays particular attention to the
politics around the drafting and approval of the Basic Policies.
Koizumi Junichirō

Although the CEFP was established during the end of Prime Minister Mori
Yoshirō’s brief tenure, Prime Minister Koizumi was the first to have the
CEFP at his disposal for annual budget negotiations, in 2001. In this case,
assessing the relationship with the ruling party is straightforward because
Koizumi’s priorities created visible opposition. Koizumi, who had committed to “destroying” the LDP, wanted to change the entire policymaking process, removing the influence of pork-barrel-driven backbenchers. Regarding
the budget process specifically, the CEFP helped Koizumi pursue his agenda,
although his leadership was essential to helping him overcome opposition
from his own party.
Under Koizumi, who oversaw five Basic Policies for the FYs between 2002
and 2007, the CEFP evolved into an important locus of budget negotiations
and a body through which the prime minister directed the budget process.
Chairing the CEFP and staffing it with those sympathetic to his agenda
largely closed the body to the influence of LDP backbenchers. This allowed
Koizumi to include proposals that would run against the preferences of
many within his own party, such as calls to limit budget expenditures, bond
issuance, and controversial items such as public works. Koizumi included in
the Basic Policies specific language that would dictate the subsequent drafting of the budget, thus reducing the scope for backroom maneuvering by
zoku Diet members and bureaucrats.
The CEFP did not solve all of Koizumi’s political problems: ultimately, it
was only an advisory board. He still had to contend with opposition from
his own party, and the Basic Policies required cabinet approval. Koizumi
faced intense opposition from his own party because of the large cuts that he
proposed, particularly in social security and public works. The prime minister did not and could not avoid this opposition, a situation that the CEFP
ultimately did not change, and he was often forced to make concessions during consultations with the LDP. But even with these concessions, the Basic
Policies heavily reflected Koizumi’s priorities. Koizumi was able to include
language that called for limiting the growth of budget expenditures and
bond issues. His hawkish approach to the budget intensified during his time
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in office as the economy began to recover. For the 2006 and 2007 Basic Policies, Koizumi succeeded in including the controversial phrase that the government would make the maximum possible reductions in expenditures
(saidaigen no saishutsu sakugen).
The CEFP also faced opposition initially from MOF, which saw the body
as encroaching on its budget authority. The critical question was how specific
the CEFP would make its Basic Policies. MOF wanted to keep the guidelines
as vague as possible, allowing it greater discretion in later stages of the budget
process. MOF also viewed the inclusion of special policy priority areas with
some degree of concern because any mention of them in the Basic Policies
was seen as empowering the spending ministries during later negotiations. As
discussed below, this became a significant problem for MOF under subsequent leaders far less sympathetic to its goal of limiting budget expenditures.
MOF argued that the Basic Policies should not include specific numerical
targets. Finance Minister Miyazawa Kiichi argued that the outline should be
broad, and he coined the term “big-boned” policy to refer to the Basic Policies.23 In practice, the Basic Policies did not include detailed numerical targets, although they provided specific targets such as not having bond issuances
or expenditures exceed those of a certain year. One significant exception was
Koizumi’s final Basic Policies document for FY 2007, which included detailed
targets as part of his Integrated Revenue and Expenditure Reform (IRER).
The IRER was an ambitious plan for fiscal consolidation that Koizumi hoped,
ultimately unsuccessfully, would commit his successors to fiscal discipline.
Although MOF did not like the encroachment of the CEFP, it is difficult
to assess the degree to which the CEFP influenced relations between Koizumi
and MOF. This is because Koizumi’s goals—cutting spending and slashing
public works—largely aligned with those of MOF. Koizumi appointed fiscal
hawks and reformists to the CEFP, and his hawkish fiscal stance was viewed
favorably within the ministry.24 Koizumi’s Basic Policies documents helped
MOF in subsequent budget negotiations to deflect spending requests.
Abe Shinzō

Abe Shinzō was a transitional figure as prime minister, owing his position in
part to his vow to continue Koizumi’s reforms, but in reality facilitating a
23. “Big-Boned Policies May Face Uncertain Future,” Daily Yomiuri, June 30, 2005.
24. MOF official, June 27, 2008, interview.
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reconstitution of the old style of policy making. Abe, whose administration
developed the Basic Policies in 2007 for the FY 2008, invited back some of
the old-guard rebels that Koizumi had kicked out of the party.25 In terms of
policy making, Abe never really controlled the agenda of the CEFP, and
under Abe, the influence of the zoku Diet members and the spending ministries returned. It is difficult to determine what exactly Abe’s policy preferences were since he sounded more or less reformist at different times. He was
also undoubtedly influenced by the approaching House of Councilors election in July 2007, which ultimately led to a large loss of LDP seats, the results of which were viewed as a reaction to Koizumi’s neo-liberal policies.
Regardless of Abe’s preferences, though, it is clear that under his administration the new CEFP did not function as it did under Koizumi.
Under Abe, the zoku and spending ministries exercised greater influence
on the CEFP agenda and what was ultimately included in the Basic Policies.
In the Basic Policies, Abe seemed to demonstrate policy initiative by including two new areas, education and the environment. In reality, the education
proposals were a repackaging of ideas supported by the education zoku, and
the relevant spending ministries had backed the environmental proposals.
Abe included in the Basic Policies language that committed the government
to achieving the largest budget expenditure cuts possible, a carryover from
Koizumi and one unpopular with the party. But LDP backbenchers and
spending ministries partly circumvented this by having their priorities included in the Basic Policies, which would help them make budget claims in
later negotiations. This situation alarmed Ota Hiroko, minister of state for
Economic and Fiscal Policy.26 As a result, the section of the Basic Policies
describing the government’s priorities, i.e., areas that should receive preferential budget treatment, expanded. On the other hand, the part dealing with
the specifics of the budget, which Koizumi had used to help restrain spending, were minimalist and vague.
Fukuda Yasuo

Under Fukuda Yasuo, the regressive trend that began with Abe’s administration continued. The Basic Policies were highly contested, but the CEFP did
25. Koizumi expelled members of his own party who opposed the privatization of the postal
system, one of his signature reforms, in 2005.
26. “Honebuto Genan Koutai Minkan Teian, Kage Usuku” [Big-boned policies draft, retreat from
private members’ prosposal, weakening influence], Asahi Shimbun [Asahi News], June 10, 2007.
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not function as an effective instrument of the executive. This was in part
because Fukuda did not have a clearly articulated vision like Koizumi. Fukuda
did not take the lead in setting the CEFP agenda and allowed LDP backbenchers and spending ministries to influence the process. Both appeared to
be emboldened after years on the defensive, and at one point, LDP Diet
members attempted to remove language that had become a pillar of the
Basic Policies since Koizumi. Specifically, under both Koizumi and Abe, the
Basic Policies asserted that the government would make the maximum possible reductions in budget expenditures. Opponents of cuts in the LDP lobbied to change the wording to state that the government would make an
“effort” to carry out the maximum possible reductions. Although initially
accepted, MOF fought back, and the original language was restored.27 Even
though Fukuda backed MOF, it was clear that neither he nor the CEFP was
setting the agenda.
In response to LDP opposition, including some entire sections within the
party’s Policy Research Council, Fukuda also retreated on specific proposals.
Specifically, the government revised a draft of the Basic Policies in response
to LDP pressure to include language giving priority to social security and
education.28 Other sensitive issues were not settled and were left to be resolved at a later date, underscoring the diminished role of the CEFP and the
role of the Basic Policies in setting the tone for subsequent budget negotiations. One area where Fukuda did clearly take up a new issue against widespread opposition from his own party was the gasoline tax, which has been
a dedicated source of revenue for road construction. Fukuda included in the
Basic Policies a provision that would abolish the earmark for road construction. Still, even this provision was largely a rearguard action in response to
proposals by the opposition DPJ.
Asō Taro

With Prime Minister Asō, the government’s commitment to fiscal reconstruction, begun under Koizumi and at least respected in word by Abe and
Fukuda, was delayed indefinitely, in part because of the global financial
27. “Kaikaku No Hata, Gyakufu Tsuyoshi ‘Honebuto No Hoshin 08’ Genan” [The reform flag,
the big-boned policies for 2008 face strong resistance], ibid., June 24, 2008.
28. “Honebuto09 Kakugi Kettei Saishutsu Sakugenhe Hidane Kiezu” [Cabinet decision on the
big-boned policies for 2009, trying to keep alive the momentum for expenditure cuts], ibid., June 28,
2008.
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crisis and Japan’s sharp economic deterioration. With the shift to fiscal
stimulus, many of the tensions between the government and the ruling
party disappeared, although the effort exacerbated tensions with fiscal
hawks, in particular MOF. Even though the goals of the Asō cabinet and
LDP backbenchers converged with fiscal stimulus, the ruling party reclaimed
its role in the budget process. With pressure from the LDP and little resistance from Prime Minister Asō, the government dispensed with many of the
targets that had been set for trimming expenditure growth, including social
security. The LDP also succeeded in removing key language urging fiscal
restraint, and the phrase “limiting budget expenditures to the maximum
extent possible” was removed entirely. Moreover, for the 2010 FY budget, the
sections in the Basic Policies that described the budget policy, which under
Koizumi were quite specific, were spare, leaving much wider scope for future
negotiations. Regarding the role of MOF, it is fairly clear that the government (and party) called the shots. This, however, had little to do with the
CEFP and new budget process, but rather represents a general trend from
the 1990s.29
General Trends

The foregoing discussion demonstrates a number of general points about
how the creation of the CEFP and the new budget process shaped the politics of budget spending. First, it is clear that drafting the Basic Policies became a highly contested part of budget negotiations. All of the key actors
viewed the Basic Policies as a new and significant stage in the overall budget
process, and consequently exerted considerable effort to shape the outcome.
The wording of the document, whether numerical targets would be included
(they were typically not), and how extensive the instructions would be regarding the future budget were all disputed. In this sense, the reform
changed the budget process, moving up the calendar and opening up new
avenues of influence. Depending on who was prime minister, however, influence ran both ways. The CEFP functioned only as an advisory council, and
ultimately, its recommendations had to be approved by the cabinet. Whether
a prime minister could craft controversial Basic Policies and win cabinet approval depended on his leadership; the CEFP did little to enhance the power
of the executive headed by a passive or weak leader.
29. Grimes, Unmaking the Japanese Miracle.
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figure 3. Length of Section on Budget in the Basic Policies for the Coming Fiscal
Year Budget
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source: Cabinet Office, Basic Policies for Macroeconomic Management [Kongo no keizai zaisei oyobi
keizaishakai no kouzou ni kansuru kihon houshin ni tsuite], 2002–10, <www.cao.go.jp>, accessed August
20, 2009.
note: 2007 data include pages from the Appendix, which is part of Koizumi’s IRER fiscal consolidation
plan. It includes very detailed guidelines for the budget.

Koizumi is the exception that proves the rule. While Koizumi wielded the
CEFP quite effectively to influence budget negotiations, he could do so because of his popularity with the electorate, which was enhanced by his image
as a reformer. Although the CEFP was a useful instrument, Koizumi’s leadership was a necessary factor that allowed him to pass his budgets. After Koizumi, under the weaker leadership of subsequent prime ministers, the
executive played less of a leading role in the budget making process. Spending ministries, zoku Diet members, and the leadership of the LDP flexed
their influence muscles during the formulation of the Basic Policies, with the
CEFP playing less and less of an independent role. One manifestation of the
declining influence of the CEFP was the declining specificity of the Basic
Policies. Under Koizumi, the Basic Policies contained much more detailed
guidelines for drafting the budget. After Koizumi, the section on the budget
became much more vague and shrank considerably, as Figure 3 illustrates.
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The relationship among the executive, the LDP, spending ministries, and
MOF changed, but only slightly. MOF still drafted the budget request
guidelines, but it had to follow the new Basic Policies when it did so. The
budget guideline itself was the product of government, LDP, and MOF negotiations, similar to the old process. One difference, however, was that the
new budget process made it easier in some cases for the spending ministries
and LDP backbenchers to tie the hands of MOF at an earlier stage by having
their programs or initiatives included as priorities in the Basic Policies. In
this regard, the new approach made it more difficult for MOF to control the
budget process.30
The CEFP did improve transparency. The deliberations of the CEFP were
published on the Web. Thus, the negotiations and contending viewpoints
were public, whereas in the past, negotiations took place largely behind the
closed doors of the LDP. Any revision or deviation from the CEFP proposals
were thus exposed to public scrutiny. This change appeared to have affected
the media coverage of the budget process. For instance, in cases where proposals of reformist or fiscally conservative private members of the CEFP
were ignored, newspapers widely criticized the LDP for backtracking.
Assessing the impact of the CEFP on Japan’s fiscal performance is difficult. There have been a number of extraordinary events since the 1990s, including a series of domestic economic recessions, Japan’s banking crisis, the
Asian Financial Crisis, the collapse of the dot.com bubble, the terrorist attacks on 9/11, and the global financial meltdown of 2008. Thus, any trends
in the data should be considered tentative and at this point impressionistic.
Figure 4 shows the change in the budget request guideline total from the
previous year. Koizumi succeeded in keeping the ceiling growth low or reducing it. Under Abe (FY 2008) and Fukuda (FY 2009), the ceiling increased
slightly. In the case of Asō (FY 2010), the ceiling increased sharply, which is
understandable given Japan’s rapid economic slowdown with the onset of the
global financial crisis. Considering the impact of the financial crisis in 2008,
which shaped the FY 2009 budget request guideline, the overall picture is
one of relative spending constraint. This picture draws further support from
the fact that the ceilings actually held all the way through the budget process, aside from the budget for FY 2009 and FY 2010. During the later stages
of drafting the 2009 budget, the onset of the global financial crisis became
30. MOF official, June 27, 2008, interview.
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figure 4. Budget Request Guideline, Change from Previous Fiscal Year
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source: Japanese Ministry of Finance, Basic Request Guideline [Ippan saishutsu no gaisan youkyuu
kijun no kangekata], 2003–10, <www.mof.go.jp>, accessed August 20, 2009.

clear, and the initial ceiling was abandoned. It should be noted, as discussed
earlier, that even prior to creation of the CEFP, budget ceilings were largely
observed for the remainder of the budget process.
One cannot draw the conclusion from the previous data that the CEFP
enhanced the government’s ability to limit budget growth, for several reasons. Most important, the budget request guideline only covers a share of
total budget spending, about 60%. The budget request guideline excludes
debt servicing costs and the Local Allocation Tax, which is distributed to
local governments by formula. Both are treated as fixed expenditures. Additionally, the actual budget submitted to and passed by the Diet can be altered mid-year through the passage of supplementary budgets. Thus, any
restraint imposed during the budget negotiations can be overridden during
the execution of the budget, with Diet approval. In practice, supplementary
budgets are passed, in some cases multiple times, virtually every FY. These
increases can be quite large, as in the late 1990s, when they exceeded 8% of
the initial budget (see Figure 5, which shows the extent to which supplementary budgets increased budget expenditures from the initial budget).
The CEFP played no significant role in determining the amount of supplementary budgets, which have been widely criticized as being arrived at by
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figure 5. Change from Initial to Final Budget
Initial vs. Final Budget
10.0%

8.0%

6.0%

4.0%

2.0%

0.0%

–2.0%

–4.0%

1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008

source: Japanese MOF, Expenditures and Revenue from the Start of Meiji [Meiji shonen ikou ippan
kaikei sainyuu saishutsu gaisan], 1990–2008, <www.mof.go.jp>, accessed August 20, 2009.

political considerations.31 Thus, the Basic Policies, which is one of the distinguishing features of the new budget process, failed to exert much influence
over a significant share of budget expenditures. Moreover, the CEFP’s Basic
Policies did not specify in any meaningful way how Japan’s second budget,
the FILP Plan, should be drafted.
BUDGET REFORM DPJ-STYLE

Since coming to power in September 2009, the new DPJ government, as
pledged during its election campaign, has embarked on a second overhaul of
Japan’s budget institutions. The new government established the Government Revitalization Unit (GRU) to vet specific budget requests. It also established the much-anticipated National Policy Unit, which effectively
superseded the now defunct CEFP, to guide economic and fiscal policy.
Although not much time has passed since the creation of Japan’s budget
institutions, they have already played a role in helping the new government
control the budget process. Both the Hatoyama Yukio and Kan Naoto administrations have taken a much more hands-on approach to spending decisions.
31. MOF official, June 24, 2008, interview.
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Thus far the GRU, rather than the National Policy Unit (NPU), has had the
highest-visibility impact on changing the budget process. The Hatoyama cabinet created the GRU in September 2009 to review government projects, making decisions on whether or not they should be reduced or abolished. The
prime minister is the chair of the GRU; the state minister of government revitalization, a cabinet appointment without portfolio, is the vice chair. The
prime minister also names several outside members. The staff of the GRU is
composed primarily of bureaucrats from various ministries.
In a series of meetings, which were publicly broadcast on the Web, the
GRU reviewed specific spending proposals. The Hatoyama administration’s
decision to make the proceedings of the GRU open to the public has been
highly significant. First, the move has been very popular with both the media
and public. Second, the increased transparency has closed off the back-door
channels that lobbyists, party backbenchers, and spending ministries used in
the past to influence the budget. Consequently, the GRU has helped the
government push through spending cuts that would have been more difficult, if not impossible, under the old budget process. While the CEFP also
increased transparency, the GRU has gone much further. The CEFP published its proceedings, but budget proceedings were limited to discussion
over general policy direction. In the case of GRU, the public proceedings
covered deliberation over specific spending items, discussions that directly
impacted specific political and bureaucratic interests.
The new budget process has also empowered MOF. Rather than view
GRU as a competitor, MOF has attempted to take advantage of the opportunity it has provided. MOF has seconded three of its staff to GRU, all fiscal
hawks with experience in the ministry’s Budget Bureau. The bureau has also
played a key supporting role, providing the technical expertise to review
government projects. MOF has been very happy with this arrangement because GRU and the new DPJ administrations have provided the backing to
make politically difficult reductions.32 Other parties, however, have been less
enthusiastic about the new process. Spending ministries have been thrown
into a defensive position, and there is a perception that the new process has
actually given too much influence to MOF. 33 The cuts also engendered a
political backlash from localities that will lose public works projects.
32. Author interview with MOF official, Tokyo, December 11, 2009.
33. Author interview with Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry official, Tokyo, December
11, 2009.
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The DPJ administrations have also provided better political insulation for
MOF. The Hatoyama administration banned lobbyists and local government
officials from directly appealing to MOF, a practice common under the old
budget process. Previously, each December the halls were busy with ministry
officials meeting with local government officials, LDP politicians, and lobbyists. Under the DPJ, the MOF building has become relatively quiet. Under
Prime Minister Hatoyama, lobbying was required to go directly through the
DPJ headquarters, specifically party General Secretary Ozawa Ichirō and the
vice general secretary, who then conveyed information to the cabinet. Although the party and cabinet have taken a hawkish stance toward public
works spending, the arrangement raised the question of how the relationship
between the two will evolve. Ozawa had no formal cabinet role, but he is one
of the most influential members of the party. He is an elections expert who
helped mastermind the DPJ’s political landslide that brought it to power, and
many newly elected DPJ Diet members owe their success to him. His recent
resignation, and the appointment to Prime Minister Kan Naoto’s cabinet of
members critical of Ozawa, seemed to suggest that his influence waned.
Ozawa also lost a bid to unseat Kan as president of the LDP, and by extension
prime minister, in September 2010, although the results show that he has
strong support among other DPJ Diet members. Ozawa no longer acts as the
key interface between the party and lobbyists. Instead, the DPJ has revived its
Policy Research Council (PRC) to play this role.
The NPU focuses on broader fiscal issues. The national policy minister,
senior vice minister for the economy, and Cabinet Office economy secretary
occupy the key leadership positions. As of June 2009, the NPU staff included 18 bureaucrats and 13 members seconded from the private sector. The
NPU, as with the CEFP, sets overall direction of economic and fiscal policy.
Additionally, the NPU, as with the CEFP, discusses specific issues such as
further reform of the budget process, the absorption of Japan’s government
bonds, pension reform, the tax system, etc.
Because the DPJ took power in the middle of the budget process for FY
2010, the NPU did not have time to have a decisive role in shaping the budget, which led to some media criticism of the NPU’s effectiveness. Still, the
DPJ attempted to use the NPU to take a more-complete view of budget
spending. Whereas the CEFP’s role was weakened by its inability to control
supplementary budgets, the FILP, and other sources of spending, the NPU
approached spending comprehensively. The NPU also proposed moving to
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a three-year budget, which would constrain the government’s use of politically motivated supplementary budgets, and the NPU as well as the GRU
have begun to look more closely at Japan’s special accounts. The NPU also
started to build capacity to monitor the execution of the budget throughout
the course of the FY, a significant departure from the CEFP.
Initially, the NPU as well as the GRU were created as provisional bodies.
Hatoyama intended to upgrade the NPU to a formal government bureau,
the National Policy Bureau (NPB), with greater authority over the budget.
Because the GRU proved to be popular, Hatoyama decided to make it permanent as well. These measures were to be included in a bill to enhance the
political leadership (seiji shudō kakuritu an). After Hatoyama’s resignation in
June 2010, Prime Minister Kan did not have time to pass the bill prior to
upper house elections in July 2010. The election produced a large loss for the
DPJ, which had held only the most tenuous control over the upper house.
Unable to form a coalition large enough to pass legislation in the upper
house, the DPJ lost the ability to pass legislation that would upgrade the
NPU and make the GRU permanent. Consequently, Kan has downgraded
the NPU, opening up the question once again of who will take the lead in
the budget process.
Still, the NPU and GRU reflect the DPJ’s preferences for greater transparency, centralization, and control over the execution of the budget. Thus far,
both bodies have the potential to help the government gain greater control
over the budget, including in areas neglected by the CEFP, although the
future of both is now uncertain. The different approach of the DPJ to budget reform, however, is a reminder that while budget institutions can have an
independent causal effect, such institutions are also endogenous, reflecting
the preferences of the government in power. Many of the changes in the
budget process under the Hatoyama and Kan cabinets are primarily the result of the different priorities of the new party in power, not institutions.
Thus far, the government has effectively created and wielded budget institutions to significant effect, but the question remains whether or not these
institutions will be durable. Hypothetically, if the LDP or some other coalition comes to power, a new government could change Japan’s budget institutions yet again. These new institutions could in turn reflect the new
government’s preferences. The failure of the DPJ to pass legislation making
the new budget institutions permanent will make it much easier for future
administrations to abandon the NPU and GRU. That said, there is likely to
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be some lock-in effect. Any administration would likely face public criticism
if attempts were made to undo the reforms. Increased transparency, in particular, has been highly popular, and efforts to reduce transparency are likely
to carry real political costs.
If the DPJ can better institutionalize its new budget process, the budgeting game will be significantly different. Already, the executive is playing a
more direct role in the budget from start to finish. Such centralization and
increased transparency are likely to increase incentives for the government to
take responsibility for its budget choices and give it enhanced control over
the process.
CONCLUSION

From the previous discussion, it is clear that both the LDP’s and DPJ’s budget reforms have been consequential, although in what way varies greatly.
The CEFP gave the executive a new forum for formulating budget policy,
one that in principle would allow it to work in greater isolation from bureaucratic and party backbencher pressure. But in practice, while the new CEFP
drafted the Basic Policies, its degree of autonomy from the ruling party and
bureaucracy depended largely on the leadership of the prime minister, his
willingness to use the body, and the political standing needed to overcome
internal party opposition. While Prime Minister Koizumi effectively used
the CEFP, subsequent prime ministers used a more decentralized process of
drafting the Basic Policies that differed only a little from the pre-reform
process. Moreover, the CEFP exerted much less influence over the later
stages of the budget drafting process and its execution.
Although the DPJ’s budget reforms are still a work in progress, they may
go further in centralizing budget-making authority in the executive. Like the
CEFP, the NPU set overarching budget policy. Although its future is now
uncertain, the DPJ is still clearly committed to assert greater executive control over the budget process from drafting to execution, an important
departure from the CEFP. The GRU allows the government to vet microlevel spending choices that had been largely left to bureaucrats and zoku
politicians. Forbidding lobbying directly to spending ministries and backbenchers also has reduced their influence.
The question remains whether the DPJ’s budget reform will help the Japanese government better cover the costs of their spending decisions and
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maintain greater fiscal discipline in the future. Ceteris paribus, the answer
appears to be yes. The government now has better mechanisms to control
spending throughout the process. But budget institutions are only one factor
influencing fiscal outcomes. While the DPJ has taken measures to strengthen
Japan’s budget-making institutions, its domestic campaign platform promised large spending increases while offering only vague commitments to increase revenue. With Japan’s fiscal situation deteriorating, the DPJ has
embraced a new fiscal consolidation agenda. With budget institutions that
will help the executive set budget allocation priorities, vet micro-level spending decisions, and control more firmly the entire budget throughout its
drafting and execution, the government will have a greater ability to implement its choices. It remains to be seen, however, how durable Japan’s new
emerging budget institutions will be.
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